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Offloading cognition  
onto cognitive technology
Itiel E. Dror & Stevan Harnad
University of Southampton / Université du Québec à Montréal
“Cognizing” (e.g., thinking, understanding, and knowing) is a mental state. 
Systems without mental states, such as cognitive technology, can sometimes con-
tribute to human cognition, but that does not make them cognizers. Cognizers 
can offload some of their cognitive functions onto cognitive technology, thereby 
extending their performance capacity beyond the limits of their own brain 
power. Language itself is a form of cognitive technology that allows cognizers to 
offload some of their cognitive functions onto the brains of other cognizers. Lan-
guage also extends cognizers’ individual and joint performance powers, distrib-
uting the load through interactive and collaborative cognition. Reading, writing, 
print, telecommunications and computing further extend cognizers’ capacities. 
And now the web, with its network of cognizers, digital databases and software 
agents, all accessible anytime, anywhere, has become our “Cognitive Commons,” 
in which distributed cognizers and cognitive technology can interoperate glob-
ally with a speed, scope and degree of interactivity inconceivable through local 
individual cognition alone. And as with language, the cognitive tool par excel-
lence, such technological changes are not merely instrumental and quantitative: 
They can have profound effects on how we think and encode information, on 
how we communicate with one another, on our mental states, and on our very 
nature. 
Introductory overview
With the development and wide use of cognitive technologies (Dror, 2007; Dascal 
& Dror, 2005), questions arise as to their effects on their human users and soci-
ety, as well as on their own scope and limits: Can cognitive technologies (i) in-
crease cognitive capacities and thus enhance human efficiency? (ii) affect how 
individuals and society go about achieving their goals? (iii) highlight and trans-
form how we view ourselves and our goals? (iv) modify how we cognize and thus 
change our mental states and nature? (v) give rise to new forms of cognition (such © 2008. John Benjamins Publishing Company
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as distributed cognition) and mental states that are either distributed across or 
even embodied in cognitive technology?
These issues are examined as follows:
(1)  The notion of an “extended mind”– with mental states (i.e., felt states) “dis-
tributed” beyond the narrow bounds of the individual brain – is not only 
as improbable as the notion that the US government can have a distributed 
migraine headache, but arbitrary.
(2)   “Cognition” – if it is simply defined as the ability to do the kinds of things that 
cognizers like us can do, plus the underlying functional mechanisms for do-
ing them – can be arbitrarily defined to be as wide or as narrow as we like.
(3)   Vagueness about the nature, locus and scope of cognizing leads to a dissocia-
tion of “cognitive states” from mental states. However, their co-occurrence had 
been our only basis for distinguishing cognitive performance capacity from 
other capacities and functionality (animate or inanimate, narrow or wide).
(4)   If cognitive states are indeed not mental states, it follows that “cognitive tech-
nology” is not just something used by cognizers, but a functional part of 
the cognitive states themselves, because the boundary between user and tool 
disappears, and cognitive states become merely instances of functional states 
in general.
(5)   We then do not need the terms “cognitive” and “distributed cognition” at all, 
and can just talk about relatively complex and wide or narrow functional 
states, leaving it a coincidence and mystery (at least at this stage) that every 
single case of what we used to call “cognitive” also happened to be mental.
(6)   A way to resolve this is to accept that only mental states are cognitive states, 
that cognition is only narrow, and that the only place cognition is “distrib-
uted” is within a single cognizer’s brain.
(7)   The only kind of “technology” that might really turn out to be intrinsically 
cognitive, rather than just being a tool used by cognizers, would be a robot 
that could pass the Turing Test (TT) – because such a TT-scale robot would 
almost certainly have mental states, and hence it would be a cognizer in its 
own right.
(8)   Whatever distributed activity was going on within the functional mechanism 
generating such a TT robot’s performance capacity would then indeed be a 
case of distributed cognition (exactly as the distributed activity within our 
own brains is distributed cognition) – even if not all the components of its 
generating mechanism were located inside the robot’s head.
(9)   The “cognitive technology” used by such a TT robot, however, would still not 
be part of its distributed cognitive (hence mental) state, just as it is not a part 
of ours.© 2008. John Benjamins Publishing Company
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(10)  Nor would a group of such TT robots, interacting and collaborating, be a 
case of distributed cognition; it would merely be a case of collaborative cog-
nition among individual (narrow) TT-robot cognizers, just as it is in the case 
of a group of collaborating human cognizers.
(11)  Cognitive technology does, however, extend the scope and power of cogni-
tion, exactly as sensory and motor technology extends the scope and power 
of the bodily senses and movement.
(12)  Just as we can see further with telescopes, move faster with cars, and do more 
with laser microsurgery than we can do with just our unaided hands and 
heads, so we can think faster and further, and do more, with language, books, 
calculators, computers, the web, algorithms, software agents, plus whatever 
is in the heads of other cognizers.
(13)  Both sensorimotor technology and cognitive technology extend our bodies’ 
and brains’ performance capacities as well as giving us the feeling of being 
able to do more than just our bodies and brains alone can do.
(14)  Sensorimotor  and  cognitive  technology  can  thus  generate  a  perceptual 
change, rather like virtual reality (VR), making us feel a difference in our 
body image and causal power (perhaps not unlike what the physical meta-
morphosis from caterpillar to butterfly might feel like, as one sensed one’s 
newfound somatic capacity to fly).
(15)  This change in perceived body image is indeed a change in mental state; but 
although its distal inputs and outputs certainly extend wider than the body 
(as all sensory inputs and all motor outputs do), the functional mechanism of 
that altered mental state is still just proximal -- skin and in – exactly as when 
it is induced by VR technology.
(16)  Hence, although sensorimotor and cognitive technology can undeniably ex-
tend our bodies’ sensorimotor and cognitive performance powers in the out-
side world, only their sensorimotor input and output contact points with our 
bodies are part of our cognitive (= mental) state, not the parts that extend 
beyond.
(17)  Perhaps it could be otherwise too, as in the case of a hypothetical TT-robot 
whose generating mechanism is indeed partly located outside its body: May-
be parts of our brain could be removed and still functionally integrated with 
the rest wirelessly, through telemetry or some other action at a distance: But 
that would just be a widened, spatially distributed body.
(18)  The resultant distributed cognitive state would still not be the same thing 
as considering a telescope, car, library or calculator as parts of a distributed 
cognitive state (for either a human or a TT robot): Those would still just be 
parts of the sensorimotor I/O to and from the cognizer’s body.© 2008. John Benjamins Publishing Company
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(19)  We are not aware of the generating mechanism underlying our cognitive ca-
pacity, however, only of its outcome: Hence retrieving a word from memory 
or retrieving a word via a Google search feels much the same to us.
(20)  Does the fact that cognizing is a conscious mental state, yet we are uncon-
scious of its underlying functional mechanism, mean that the underlying 
functional mechanism could include Google, Wikipedia, software agents 
and other human cognizers’ heads after all?  
(21)  The worldwide web, a distributed network of cognizers, digital databases and 
sofware agents, has become our “Cognitive Commons,” in which cognizers 
and cognitive technology can share cognizing anytime and anywhere, and 
interact globally with a speed, scope and degree of interactivity that yield dis-
tributed cognizing with performance powers inconceivable within the scope 
of individual cognition.
(22)  Such changes go beyond mere quantitative increase in efficiency and per-
formance power. As we increase our use and reliance on cognitive technolo-
gies, they effect and modify how we cognize, how we do things and what we 
do. Just as motor technology extended our physical ability and modified our 
physical life, cognitive technology extends our cognitive ability and modifies 
our mental life.
Part I: What distributed cognition is not
Meaning:  Narrow  and  wide.  Philosophers,  in  wrestling  with  the  problem  of 
meaning (“Is meaning in the head or is it in the world?”) have sometimes resorted 
to saying that there are two kinds of meaning, “narrow” and “wide,” with the for-
mer located between the ears and the latter distributed across the entire universe 
– both the Newtonian universe of distant stars and the Platonic universe of the 
eternal truths of logic and mathematics. The wide meaning of “apple,” for example, 
includes not only whatever it is that I may have in mind when I think of or say 
“apple,” but also what apples really are, out there in the world.1 
That, however, is all metaphysics, and concerns the existence and “reality” of 
some elusive entity called “meaning.” The mission of cognitive science is more 
modest: Humans and other organisms have certain functional capacities, includ-
ing metabolism, reproduction, and locomotion. It is clear that each of these ca-
pacities is “narrow,” even though it sometimes involves a local interaction between 
the organism and part of the world around it (be that other organisms or the in-
animate world). © 2008. John Benjamins Publishing Company
All rights reserved
  Offloading cognition onto cognitive technology  5
Performance capacity. Movement itself, inasmuch as it includes the movements 
of  parts of the organism, and not just the whole of the organism, covers everything 
that we are able to do; and that, in turn, extends naturally to all of our cognitive 
capacities – what we are able to think, deduce, understand, etc. – encompassing 
also the internal mechanisms that generate those capacities.
So far, that makes all of cognition narrow: skin and in. It is not that we do 
not (as in metabolism and reproduction) interact with objects (and skins) outside 
our own skin. Although usually it is not particularly illuminating to speak of eat-
ing and digestion as a dyadic function, “distributed” between predator and prey. 
Reproductive function is for the most part decidedly dyadic and to that extent 
distributed more widely than a single organism.2 
Distributed perception? Gibson (1966), too, has stressed that even something as 
seemingly passive as seeing is in fact interactive, with the locomotory organism 
perceiving things in terms of their sensorimotor “affordances” – what our dynamic 
bodies are able to do with external things. Don’t look for the purely sensory prop-
erty that all “chairs” share: their real invariant is that they afford “sittability upon” 
– a property that cannot even be defined without reference to the shape and motor 
capacity of our bodies as well as the shape of things in the external world.
Does it follow from this that the perceptual state of perceiving something is 
a distributed state that includes the perceiving organism as well as the external 
object or event or action that is being perceived? And – to extend this question 
further – is the cognitive state of thinking or knowing about something a distrib-
uted state, consisting of the cognizing organism plus the external object or event 
or action (or property or state) that is being cognized (Clark & Chalmers 1998; 
Wilson 2004)?
Let us defer reply until we consider a few more cases, noting only that this 
question about whether perception/cognition is just (i) internal and local or (ii) 
internal/external and distributed is similar to the question of whether meaning is 
narrow or wide.
Physical states: Narrow and wide: A trivial answer would be that every physical 
state is “distributed” in that nothing is ever causally isolated from everything else. 
So in singling out (“individuating”) any physical “state” we are individuating an 
arbitrary subset of the total state of the universe: This chair is not causally isolated 
from the ground it rests upon, nor the ground from the rest of the planet, spinning 
about the solar system, etc. By that token, all states are wide – as wide as the world, 
including oneself, sitting on the chair. 
But the fact that there is no such thing as an absolutely isolated local entity 
or state is not what we mean when we ask whether cognitive states are narrow or 
wide. Otherwise, the state of a toaster, toasting bread, is wide too, and includes not © 2008. John Benjamins Publishing Company
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only the toaster and the bread, but also the events transpiring on faraway Alpha 
Centauri.
But, leaving aside the physics and metaphysics of wide causality and action-
at-a-distance: what about just the toaster and the bread? Does the “state” of a 
toaster, toasting bread, include the bread, being toasted? It seems obvious that 
this distinction, too, is arbitrary, hence trivial: We can include the toaster in a 
distributed hybrid state and call that a state of the toaster, or a state of toasting. 
Or we can say that the toaster does what it does, and the bread gets done to it 
whatever is done to it, but we will consider their states as distinct, acting upon 
one another (more the toaster acting on the bread than vice versa, unless the 
toast catches fire) but not a joint, distributed state worth speaking of as such, 
in useful discussions of either toasters or bread, and their respective functional 
states and properties.
Autonomous systems.  But although there are no states or systems that are com-
pletely isolated causally, there are surely “things” – like chairs and bread and toast-
ers – that are sufficiently isolated to be called autonomous things. Some of these 
autonomous things will be (again, only relatively) static, like chairs and bread, and 
some relatively dynamic, like a toaster – if plugged in and functioning. Some of 
these autonomous things may also be parts of other, wider autonomous things. 
Toasters have functional parts that can do what they do on their own, in isolation 
from the toaster. A toaster, in turn, may be part of a more elaborate device that 
toasts as well as butters, fills and wraps your sandwich; or simply a component in 
a modular commercial kitchen.
So in this approximate way, bracketing the issue of wide causality, we arrive at 
the notion of autonomous systems, like toasters, composed sometimes of compo-
nents that are themselves autonomous systems. Let us call those subcomponents 
autonomous modules, and note that any autonomous system could in principle 
also be an autonomous module in one (or many) wider autonomous systems.
But is a toaster really autonomous? Don’t we have to build it, plug it in to the 
electrical system, and then put in the bread, and set the level, etc.? Are the toaster 
and bread and ourselves just part of a still wider distributed system, the one with 
the real autonomy, while the toaster and the bread are merely “slave” systems, with 
no autonomy of their own?
We cannot avoid extending our relentless questions to asking what we really 
mean by “autonomy”: Is anything really autonomous, apart from the universe it-
self, or God almighty? This is again the question of causal isolation, and maybe we 
can again finesse it by settling for commonsense approximations: A system is au-
tonomous if it can do what it does “on its own.” It’s just that systems differ in what 
they can do on their own. A toaster is an autonomous system that can only toast © 2008. John Benjamins Publishing Company
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bread – and that, only if a person plugs it in, puts in the bread, presses the switch. 
A person is an autonomous system that can (among other things) plug in a toaster, 
put in bread, and press the switch. And so it goes. Both autonomy and functional 
capacity look modular, and superordinate autonomous systems may include the 
distributed modularity of many component autonomous systems.
We can easily get lost in this mereological maze, so let us avoid the lure of 
“general system theory” and just note that, yes, there are quasi-autonomous things 
and quasi-autonomous states, and those things and states may themselves be dis-
tributed parts of other, wider quasi-autonomous things and states. That’s all indis-
putable even before we get to the question of cognizing and distributed cognition. 
But before we broach that question, we alas have to ask yet another basic question: 
What is cognition?
Cognitive and vegetative function. To a first approximation, we have already 
answered this: cognition is whatever gives cognitive systems the capacity to do 
what they can do. It is the causal substrate of performance capacity. Cognitive 
systems (“cognizers”) include ourselves and perhaps other animals (and possibly 
also extraterrestrial creatures, if they exist).  Do they include anything more? Are 
living systems the only cognizers? Are cognizers necessarily local, or can they be 
distributed? And is the capacity underlying everything that we cognizers can do 
cognitive, or only the capacity underlying some of what we can do?   
One question at a time. Let us first agree that not everything a human being 
can do is cognitive. Breathing, for example, except in some special cases, is not 
cognitive; neither is balance, again, except in some special cases. What are the 
special cases? They are when we breathe or adjust our balance consciously. Other-
wise, breathing and balance are unconscious and automatic – we might call them 
“vegetative” rather than cognitive functions.
Consciousness. But surely consciousness itself cannot be the mark of cognition 
either, because although when we take conscious control of our breathing or 
our balance that is undoubtedly cognitive, we are not really conscious of how we 
control breathing or balance. If we suddenly feel we are suffocating or falling over, 
we “command” our lungs to breathe and our limbs to right themselves, but we are 
hardly conscious of how our commands are implemented. It is physiologists who 
must discover how we manage to do those things.
And, by the same token, if we do something that we are more accustomed 
to calling cognitive, such as perceiving a chair, understanding the meaning of a 
word, or remembering the product of seven times nine, all of which we cognize 
consciously, we are nevertheless unconscious of how we manage to perceive a chair 
as a chair,3 how we understand the meaning of, say “cognitive,” or even how we re-
trieve (from wherever we “stored” it decades ago) the product of seven and nine.© 2008. John Benjamins Publishing Company
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Fear not, dear reader, we have not been forced into the clutches of the meta-
physical problem of Free Will here. We simply need to make the observation that 
what makes some of our capacities cognitive rather than vegetative ones is that we 
are conscious while we are executing them, and it feels like we are causing them 
to be executed – not necessarily that we are conscious of how they get executed 
(Libet 1985). 
But  that’s  not  enough.  We  have  an  initial  approximate  criterion  for  what 
performance capacities count as cognitive: It is the ones we execute consciously, 
which just means that we normally have to be conscious while we are executing 
them (This criterion is actually flawed, but we will fix it later.)
Is there cognizing without consciousness? Now the second question: Are there 
any other cognitive systems besides ourselves and animals? We have already noted 
that not all of our performance capacities are cognitive: the cognitive ones are the 
ones we execute consciously (although we are not conscious of how they are ex-
ecuted by our brains). The question of whether systems other than animals like us 
cognize is hence related to the question of whether or not there can be cognizing 
without consciousness: It concerns which organisms are conscious, and whether 
nonconscious – perhaps even nonliving – systems, can be cognizers too.
The “other-minds” problem. Let us quickly agree (with Hume and Descartes) 
that there is absolutely no way for one to know for sure whether anyone (or any-
thing) but oneself is conscious. (This is called the “other minds” problem, and it 
is insoluble.) Hence we already have a problem here, if consciousness is the mark 
of the cognitive. We can’t know for sure who or what is or isn’t conscious. But do 
things get even worse? Doomed to be left agnostic about whether anyone or any-
thing else is conscious, are we even more agnostic, then, about whether noncon-
scious systems can cognize?
What is alive? Here there may be useful lessons to be drawn from the problem 
of life: Very similar questions have been raised about what it is for a system to be 
alive. We used to think there had to be a “vital force.” Now we know better; life is 
just the state of certain dynamical systems, having certain structural and func-
tional properties, including molecular ones. The properties of living systems are 
all objective and observable, so once it has been ascertained that those properties 
are indeed present, there is no vitalist homologue of the “other minds” problem 
to trouble us, about whether or not the system is really in a biotic state, i.e., “really 
alive.” The observable, objective properties of living systems exhaust all there is to 
being alive (other, perhaps, than the “other minds” problem itself, for those who 
hold that all living systems must be conscious!).© 2008. John Benjamins Publishing Company
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Biotic states: Narrow and wide? The same question of distributedness – “nar-
row” versus “wide” life – arises also with living things: We all know the case of 
the amoeba, which is an individual, autonomous, one-celled organism, definitely 
alive in its own right. But when individual amoebae find themselves together in 
a certain chemical gradient, they coalesce and become a further, superordinate, 
fungus-like organism called a slime-mold. This is “distributed” life, in the sense 
that it is wider than any of the individual amoebae (who nevertheless remain alive 
too), and encompasses the entire slime mold, which is then an autonomous, su-
perordinate, living organism.
Something like the slime mold was also probably the origin of all multicellular 
organisms, all the way up to ourselves: We are instances of “wide” life, distributed 
over all our individual living (though only minimally autonomous) cells. 
Distributed life. So far, so good. But, can a group of organisms working and func-
tioning as one, be an individual organism? What about a sports team or an army 
unit? Or a colony of ants or bees? Even more controversially, some have gone on 
to argue that an entire biological species may also be an individual organism -- a 
wider, superordinate organism, distributed over all its members, much the way the 
slime mold is a superordinate organism distributed over its individual modules, 
the amoebae (Hull 1976).
And it can get even wider, some arguing that Earth itself is a superordinate 
organism, “Gaia,” distributed over the entire biosphere (Lovelock 2000). Perhaps 
some exobiologists will want to argue that if there is life elsewhere in the universe, 
then all instances of biotic systems are distributed subcomponents of yet another 
individual mega-organism.
We will not settle the question of “distributed life” here one way or the other, 
except to note that (apart from the relatively coherent multi-cellular organisms 
“supervening” on individual living cells) the criteria for individuating wider and 
wider forms of life begin to look just as arbitrary as the extension of physical states 
(on the grounds that no physical sub-state is totally isolated causally) to the size 
of the entire universe. Nor is it clear any more what, if anything, is at stake when 
we can call many distributed things one superordinate thing at will, mixing and 
matching according to taste. We should try to avoid such a state of affairs with 
distributed cognition. 
The questions of distributed life and of distributed cognition, however, are not 
independent, because (to a first approximation) it is living organisms that cog-
nize (those of them that do), and it is likewise living organisms that are conscious 
(those of them that are). © 2008. John Benjamins Publishing Company
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Spatial and causal disjointness. Up to the level of continuous multi-cellular or-
ganisms, we can agree about what is and is not a living organism. Consensus and 
coherence collapse only when we move to the level of the species or Gaia, as both 
the spatial distance and the causal interactions among the component organisms 
get distributed more and more widely and loosely: Fungi are the biggest uncon-
testable organisms on the planet. Some of them can grow underground to a size of 
over 2,000 acres and live more than 2,000 years. Their individual fruiting bodies, 
the mushrooms (that we mistake as being the whole organism), though remote 
from one another in space, are all continuously connected.
What about a coral colony, or, better, an ant colony?  Is it such a stretch from 
the spatially continuous and tightly coupled causal interactions of the amoebae 
that constitute a slime mold to the only somewhat more spatially disjoint and less 
tightly coupled causal interactions of the ants that constitute a colony? Within 
multi-cellular organisms there is action at a distance (for example, via chemical 
gradients) as well as coherent but distributed activity (as in a neural network). And 
we all know that “spatial continuity” breaks down at microscopic scales.
Fortunately, in individuating organisms there are other criteria besides spatial 
and temporal continuity. There is DNA, which can help resolve (up to cloning) 
whether or not two bits are (or were) indeed parts of the same organism. But ge-
netic relatedness is only relative, which is what allows some to argue that species 
are individuals and that Gaia is a mega-organism. 
Distributed mental states? We can avoid having to wrestle with the metaphysical 
problem of individual identity in making our bets as to whether something is a 
case of individual life or just multiple life, interacting. Siamese twins offer a clue: 
Why are we ready to contemplate the possibility that Gaia, or an entire species, or 
an ant colony, might be one single, widely distributed, physically disjoint organ-
ism, yet we are not ready to consider that Siamese twins, no matter how tightly 
fused they are physically, are one single organism?  The example illustrates how 
tightly interconnected and fused the questions of distributed life and distributed 
cognition really are (at least in our minds):
The reason we would never dream of saying that Siamese twins are one single 
distributed organism is that they have two different minds. And distinctness (or 
identity) of minds trumps all of our other intuitions and inclinations, insofar as 
individuating either organisms or cognizers is concerned. Suppose Siamese twins 
could share every last body part yet could still have two distinct minds: not as in 
the ambiguous case of multiple personality disorder, where the “minds” (if they 
are really different minds at all) come and go serially, like masks, but where they 
are always jointly present, and you can communicate with them, and they with one 
another, simultaneously, exactly as in the case of ordinary Siamese twins (except © 2008. John Benjamins Publishing Company
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that both cannot speak at exactly the same time). We would still have profound 
difficulty seeing them as one and the same “organism” – or perhaps we should say 
that the notion of an individual “organism” would simply lose its meaning for us 
in such a situation: They would be one “biotic system,” in some technical sense, but 
two distinct “cognizers.”4  
Is this “animism” (which was probably always latent in the “vitalism” that has 
since been discredited by molecular and evolutionary biology), just in our minds? 
Should we be accepting objective, system-based functional inventories of what does 
or does not count as a distinct cognizer, as we do with what does or does not count as 
being alive? Or does our subjective sense have some privileged say in the matter?
Mind-reading. The very same mentalistic intuition that underlies how many cog-
nizers we perceive within a single organism can cut the other way too: The reason 
most of us are not ready to see an ant colony, a species, a corporation, a govern-
ment, a sports team, an army unit or Gaia as either an individual organism or a 
cognizer is that we do not perceive any of them as having a mind. We can, with a 
little effort, see a tree or a fungus, a coral, an amoeba or a slime mold as a living 
organism, like us, especially if biologists tell us it is so; but we would have great dif-
ficulty seeing any of them as cognizers – unless we are ready to see them as being 
conscious (having a mind). 
We do have natural “mind-reading” abilities and inclinations (Whiten 1991), 
along with fertile imaginations. When we are children, and our animism is at its 
”widest,” we are ready to see a tree as watching or even waving at us, or to believe 
that it hurts the tree when we kick it.  Past a certain age, children also have a great 
deal of difficulty not believing that it hurts a dog, or another child, if they kick it.5
We perceive other minds because we can (sometimes) detect the Gibsonian “af-
fordances” (perhaps via our “mirror neurons”) of being in a mental state: We know 
what it’s like to have a mind, because we each have one. The rest is our “mirror 
neurons,” detecting when another mind is in a mental state like our own, because 
it is doing something like what we would be doing in that mental state. In other 
words, we mind-read through a combination of having a mind and perceiving its 
bodily performance correlates in others (Gallese & Goldman 1998).
The “other minds” problem does not go away; our ‘mind reading’ is not based 
on flawless deductive reasoning. The logic that similar consequences must have 
similar causes (I have a mind and know its bodily outcome, therefore such bodily 
outcomes in others must be caused by a mind) gives raise to false positives and 
false negatives. Hence we are fallible mind-readers. Seeing the tree as having a 
mind is probably a false positive. Might seeing Gaia as not having a mind be a false 
negative? Perhaps. But let us be clear about exactly what we would be getting right 
or wrong, when we made a correct “hit” versus a false positive or negative:© 2008. John Benjamins Publishing Company
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Living and cognizing. If Gaia, or a species (e.g., the earth’s elephant population as 
a whole) did have a mind, that would mean, roughly speaking, that it was the kind 
of thing that was capable of having a headache (not necessarily having a head, just 
having a headache), say, a migraine. The migraine is just a stand-in, here, for our 
intuitions about what it is to have a mind at all. To have a mind is to be in a mental 
state, and a mental state is simply a felt state:  To have mind is to feel something – to 
feel anything at all (e.g., a migraine).6
And make no mistake about it: you must have a mind – i.e. you must be in a 
mental state, you must be able to feel – in order to have any inkling at all of what it 
means to have a mind! A toaster will not get that from a dictionary definition. Out-
side minds there is nothing but mindless (feelingless, insentient) functionality.
The migraine test. The migraine is merely our stand-in for the capacity to feel 
anything at all – in other words, for being conscious. We all know what it feels like 
to have a headache. All feelings are pretty much like that, mutatis mutandis, from 
what it feels like to perceive a chair, to what it feels like to understand the meaning 
of a word or to remember the product of seven and nine. Note that what is essen-
tial for having a mind is not having the performance capacity itself – being able to 
detect the presence of the chair, being able to define or reply correctly to the word, 
being able to retrieve “sixty-three ” – nor is it essential to have an understanding of 
the underlying causal mechanism of that performance capacity (knowing how we 
manage to do it). The essential thing for having a mind is being able to feel what it 
is like to have and execute the capacity – or to feel anything at all (e.g., a migraine). 
This is the consciousness that accompanies cognizing (though without necessarily 
any consciousness of how the cognizing actually works).
Suppose it was somehow true that Gaia (or the entire elephant species, or an 
ant colony) was indeed a superordinate living organism, distributed across every-
thing in the earth’s biosphere (or across all elephants, or all the ants in a colony). 
And suppose the reason we wrongly thought Gaia was not an organism was that 
we couldn’t imagine such a distributed system as being capable of having a mi-
graine (or any other mental state). We could of course have been wrong about that 
too: Maybe Gaia could have a migraine. (Because of the other-minds problem, 
there is no way to be sure one way or the other.) 
But suppose we were right that Gaia has no mind yet wrong that Gaia is not a 
living organism. In that case, our mind-reading mirror-neurons would have been 
right – they detected no mind. But they would nevertheless have steered us into 
a false negative, because Gaia, though mindless, is nevertheless alive.  In contrast, 
the child’s mirror-neurons commit a false positive on the migraine test, wrongly 
inferring that a tree does have a mental state, though it does not, but the child is 
nevertheless right (though for the wrong reasons) that the tree is alive. In both © 2008. John Benjamins Publishing Company
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cases, being an organism was conflated, animistically, with having a mind. This 
is an error; living and feeling are not necessarily the same thing. There could be 
living organisms that have no mental states and there could be nonliving systems 
that do have mental states.
Cognitive states and mental states. Can the same distinction be made, however, 
if we apply the same mind-reading criterion to being a cognizer, rather than to be-
ing a living organism? We (or rather, our mind-reading mirror neurons) insisted, 
in the case of the Siamese twins with only one body, that even if Biology were to 
tell us that they were one single organism, they would still be two distinct cogniz-
ers, if they had two distinct minds: They would not have one, shared mind, even 
though they did have one, shared body. And if they had a migraine, it would be 
two migraines, even if it was implemented in one and the same head – just as when 
something is a “headache” for the US Congress, it is at most N distinct headaches 
in the heads of N distinct members of congress, with no further superordinate en-
tity feeling an N+1st headache (or feeling anything at all). There is no such thing as 
a distributed migraine – or, rather, a migraine cannot be distributed more widely 
than one head. And as migraines go, so goes cognizing too – and with it cognition: 
Cognition cannot be distributed more widely than a head – not if a cognitive state 
is a mental state.
Cognitive Technology: Tools R Us? Does this settle the question of distributed 
cognition, or does it beg it? The case for distributed cognition is based mostly on 
cognitive technology: the argument is that even something as simple as an external 
piece of paper with a phone number on it is a piece of cognitive technology -- a 
peripheral device on which data are stored. If the phone number were encoded 
inside one’s brain, as a memory, there would be no dispute at all about its being 
part of the (internally) distributed cognitive state of, say, knowing or finding that 
phone number. Why, then, would we no longer consider that same datum as part 
of that distributed cognitive state just because its locus happened to be outside the 
cognizer’s body?
Moreover, once we realize that our cognitive states include data that are lo-
cated on an external piece of paper, then it becomes apparent that they include 
far more than that – widely distributed things, ranging from everything located in 
our libraries and on the Web, to every auxiliary device, process or datum that may 
enter into any cognizing or its outcome, extending also to everything located in 
the narrow heads of all other individual cognizers (Hollan et al. 2000). Whether 
we want to include in a cognitive state everything that can potentially enter into 
anyone’s cognizing or only what actually enters into someone’s cognizing, either 
way, on this extended view, cognition is looking exceedingly wide.© 2008. John Benjamins Publishing Company
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The Extended Mind. This wide view of distributed cognition is also called the 
“extended mind hypothesis” (Clark & Chalmers 1998; Wilson 2004). It has some 
affinities with wide theories of meaning, in which apples themselves, or the truths 
about apples, are taken to be part of the distributed meaning of “apple,” which is 
thereby extended beyond what may be going on within the narrow confines of 
the head of any individual, local cognizer. The extended mind is also reminiscent 
of the notion of “wide” toaster-states (in which the bread is part of a distributed 
state of the toaster), thereby also inheriting the apparent arbitrariness of such state 
extensions.
We must accordingly ask ourselves why we would want to contemplate such 
arbitrary extensions of what it is to have or to be a mind, hence to be a cognizer 
and to cognize? Why would it even cross our minds? The answer is again the (in-
soluble) other-minds problem: Since there is no way of knowing for sure whether 
any cognizer other than oneself has a mind, there is even less way of knowing 
whether or not there can be cognizing without a mind, or even of knowing what 
the actual geographic boundaries of a mind are. 
We know, objectively, what cognition does. Doing is performance capacity. 
Cognitive science is also beginning to make some progress in explaining the func-
tional mechanism generating that performance capacity (i.e., how our brains do 
it). We also know that so far the only systems that our adult “mind-reading” ca-
pacities have tentatively identified as being cognizers have been living organisms 
like ourselves. Our confidence that we have detected an “other mind” increases the 
more the candidate resembles ourselves, both in its appearance and in its perfor-
mance capacities. That is in fact the (narrow) meaning of “cognition”: the kinds of 
things that I and other living organisms can do, using our minds.
But there are other candidates that also seem to be able to do some of the 
things that living organisms like us can do, and not just the vegetative things, but 
the things we have identified as cognitive, when performed by us. Computers and 
robots are not only doing more and more of what only living organisms like us 
used to be able to do, but even the functional mechanisms that biology and cogni-
tive science are proposing to explain how organisms do it often turn out to draw 
on the same functional mechanisms that explain how computers and robots do it. 
(Indeed, the functional explanation often comes from the fact that we have pro-
grammed computers and designed robots to do what we do, and in so doing, we 
have also provided a potential explanation of how our own brains do it). So, if it 
walks and quacks like a duck, and even its internal mechanism is like that of a 
duck, it’s only natural to assume it’s some kind of duck too.
The Turing Test. This is the rationale and the methodology behind the Turing 
Test (TT; Turing 1950; Epstein et al. 2008): If we can design a system that can do © 2008. John Benjamins Publishing Company
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everything that we can do – and do it so well that even our mind-reading mirror-
neurons perceive it as having a mind – then we have no more (or less) reason to 
doubt that it has a mind than we have for doubting that other human beings have 
minds (again because of the other-minds problem). In addition, the TT-passing 
candidate – which has to be a robot, because a computer alone cannot have all of 
our sensorimotor capacities – will provide us with at least one explanation of the 
functional mechanism underlying our own cognitive capacity.
Hence the question of narrow vs. wide cognition is also a question about what 
is and is not part of the functional mechanism of a TT-passing robot: What needs 
to be “inside” such a robot in order to pass the TT? Note that this is not the ques-
tion of whether we need to pack all its functions inside its head, the way ours are 
packed inside our heads. It is conceivable that the mechanism of the TT robot 
could be more widely distributed: some of it inside and some of it outside its body, 
integrated wirelessly, perhaps, from some central location. The states consisting of 
the joint activity of the robot-internal and the robot-external components of the 
mechanism that gives the robot the capacity to pass the TT would be indisputably 
distributed cognitive states. 
But those hypothetically distributed robot states (if they are possible at all) do 
not settle the question we are inquiring about here. Nor would they settle it even 
if it were somehow possible to breed people with parts of their brains physically 
located outside their bodies and their joint activity integrated through wireless 
telemetry or some such. Such a hypothetical distributed robot (or person) could 
even have a distributed migraine. But what we would really have then would be a 
robot (or person) with an extended (or distributed) body. The constituents of its 
mental states would all still be (distributed) within that one distributed body. Our 
brains, after all, are still parts of our bodies, even if they could be removed, all or 
in part, temporarily or permanently, the way our hearts have been, and somehow 
kept functionally integrated with our bodies wirelessly.
This is all cog-sci-fi. But the point of the example is to show that this sort of 
hypothetical cognitive state – distributed across multiple parts of a robot’s func-
tional mechanism (or even multiple parts of an organism’s brain) that happen to 
be widely separated in space but coordinated wirelessly (Dennett 1981) – does not 
address the question of whether or not cognitive technology is part of our cognitive 
state too. An affirmative answer to the question of whether the parts of my brain 
that control the left and right sides of my body could be moved out of my brain 
and two miles apart while still being able to remotely coordinate my walking, does 
not address the question of whether cars or calculators are a part of my mind. 7
Software agents. It is not just today’s (sub-TT) robots that appear to be doing some 
of the things we cognizers do: Software agents seem to be doing it too, including © 2008. John Benjamins Publishing Company
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communities of distributed software agents, interacting among themselves, trawl-
ing the net, executing local as well as distributed computations on local and dis-
tributed data, and displaying – not just individually but also collectively – perfor-
mance capacities that, in living organisms like ourselves, we would have taken to 
be the result of cognizing (Dror 2007).  
These autonomous devices – both hardware and software – are, of course, like 
toasters. But they are “cognitive” toasters, in that they operate not on bread but 
on informational inputs, to generate, as output, performance that we would have 
called cognitive if we had been the ones doing it.  Particularly in the case of the 
joint activity of distributed software agents, autonomously crawling the web, it is 
obvious why the question of whether a datum is internal or external becomes ar-
bitrary. The datum may be the input to one agent or the output of another, and the 
distributed cognitive system consists of all the agents and their inputs and outputs 
together anyway. It makes little sense, nor is it of much use, to try to say which is 
the bread and which is the toaster in such cases. But is what these systems are do-
ing (whether they are local pieces of hardware or distributed digital data and the 
software agents programmed to process them) cognizing, or just something that is 
similar to what ordinarily requires cognizing to do? The question seems to be as 
undecidable as whether or not Gaia is really a living organism. 
Part II: What distributed cognition is
Wide-Body Beings. In Part I we argued that inasmuch as cognition is mentation 
(i.e., insofar as cognizing is thinking), there can only be distributed cognitive states 
where there can be distributed mental states. Within the head there are narrowly 
distributed cognitive states, since neural states are presumably not all local and 
punctate. If the mechanism that generates mental states and bodily performance 
capacity (normally the brain) could be more widely distributed in space (beyond 
the head), and still be integrated somehow so as to generate coordinated mental 
states and bodily function, then that too would be widely distributed cognition, 
whether in a hypothetical TT-scale robot or a hypothetically re-engineered organ-
ism, but that would also be a widely distributed body. Distributed cognition would 
still not be wider than the body.
Can there be distributed cognition beyond the bounds of the body and the 
brain? In particular, can external cognitive technology serve as a functional part of 
our cognitive states, rather than just serving as input to and output from them?
Mental states are conscious states. Let us consider brain states, rather than just 
mental or cognitive states. We have agreed that not everything our bodies do is © 2008. John Benjamins Publishing Company
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cognitive. Some of it, like breathing, balance, or temperature control is vegetative. 
So, too, are the brain states that implement those vegetative functions. We have 
also agreed that although cognizing is conscious, we are not conscious of how 
cognizing is implemented. When we recognize a chair, or understand a word, or 
retrieve the product of seven and nine from our memory, the outcome, a con-
scious experience, is delivered to us on a platter. We are not conscious of how 
we recognized the chair, understood the word, or retrieved “63”. Hence the brain 
states that implement those cognitive functions are not conscious either. Are un-
conscious brain states mental?
Are unconscious brain states mental?  The natural answer would seem to be: no. 
unconscious states are unconscious states. The states of a toaster are unconscious 
and certainly not mental. Until further notice, “conscious states” is synonymous 
with “mental states.” The brain states implementing vegetative function are not 
mental either: Presumably a person in a chronic vegetative state is as unconscious 
as a toaster (although, because of the other-minds problem, we can never be sure 
about either the toaster or the comatose person). The only reason we want to call 
the brain states that occur while we are conscious mental states is that they occur 
while we are in a conscious state, and they physically implement that conscious 
state. (We are on the fuzzy boundary of the mind/body problem here.) But just as 
vegetative states such as the regulation of breathing, which occur unconsciously 
while we are conscious, are nevertheless not themselves mental, nor part of our 
mental state, why would we want to call the unconscious state that “delivers” our 
conscious mental state mental? 
When you say to yourself “what is seven times nine?” and then “sixty-three” 
pops up, you are certainly conscious of thinking “sixty-three.” So that’s definitely 
mental; and so is the brain state that corresponds to your thinking “sixty-three.” 
But what about the brain state that actually found and delivered the “sixty-three”? 
You are certainly not conscious of that, although you were just as conscious while 
your brain was finding and delivering “sixty-three” as while you were breathing, 
though you don’t feel either of those states.
Neural vs google storage and retrieval. Let us make the retrieval interval longer 
then, just to make the problem more vivid: You are trying to remember the name 
of a poet. You know he wrote “Tell me not in mournful numbers, life is but an end-
less dream” and his name is on the tip of your tongue, but you just can’t retrieve it. 
You go to sleep, and next morning “Henry Wadsworth Longfellow” immediately 
pops up. You were not even awake during the brain state that retrieved it. So what 
difference does it make if you recall it through an unconscious retrieval state in 
your brain, or by Googling it (again relying on a state in some remote computer © 2008. John Benjamins Publishing Company
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and database of which you are not conscious)? Are they not both based on an un-
conscious, nonmental state, in the first case narrow and neural, inside your brain, 
in the second case wide and computational, distributed between your brain and a 
computer hundreds or thousands of miles away?
Distributed databases. And what about a modern child, who has never bothered 
to memorize the multiplication tables, as you did, because a computer is always at 
hand? The only way he ever retrieves 7 x 9 is to key it in, and read off the product. 
He blindly consults his computer when you blindly consult your memory: What’s 
the difference? Never mind computers: the poet’s name could be read out of a 
static book that indexes poems’ first lines. Or you could just ask somebody who 
knows to tell you who wrote those lines. What difference does it make if the data-
base in which the datum is stored, outside your awareness, is in your brain, or on 
the shelf of a library, or in someone else’s brain? 
Offloading brainwork. The beginning of cognitive technology was surely lan-
guage, which allowed cognizers to “offload” a lot of brainwork onto other brains 
that could do it for you, and deliver you the results, and vice-versa (Cangelosi & 
Harnad 2001; Dascal 2004). Are our own neural states, plus Google states, plus 
book states, plus the neural states in the heads of other cognizers all parts of dis-
tributed cognitive states – and if so, whose cognitive states? I am presumably the 
cognizer of my narrow cognitive states, but who is the cognizer of the wide ones? 
Or are cognitive states just sui generis, rather than belonging to anyone in particu-
lar? Neural firings in brains, plus keystrokes on computers, bits coursing across fi-
bre optic cables, remote disk activity, print in a library book, neural states in other 
people’s brains – all just parts of wide, distributed, disembodied cognitive states, 
taking place here, there, and everywhere: cognizing, with no cognizer?8
At the very least, we need to pinpoint the cognizer of the distributed cognitive 
state. Let us say it is the user of the cognitive technology, and that what we are ask-
ing is whether the technology outside the body is part of or merely I/O to/from a 
narrow cognitive state inside his brain?
Sensorimotor technology and augmented reality. Let us start by considering a 
kindred kind of technology, perhaps not quite cognitive, only sensorimotor, with 
the corresponding states being sensorimotor states rather than fully cognitive 
ones: Sensorimotor technology probably began in our species’ prehistory with 
tools and weapons, which extended our performance capacities dramatically. Let 
us consider a relatively recent tool:
If you look at a star through a telescope, is that a distributed sensorimotor 
state, consisting of your brain and retina plus the telescope (and perhaps also 
the star), in which your visual capacity is augmented by the telescope’s power of © 2008. John Benjamins Publishing Company
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refraction? Or is it just input to your narrow, skin-and-in sensorimotor state – in-
put augmented by the telescope?
If you are driving a car, is that an extended sensorimotor state, in which your 
body is moving at speeds in excess of what it can manage alone, narrowly? The 
wider, distributed sensorimotor state might include the car and its locomotor ca-
pacity. Or is it just output from your narrow, skin-and-in sensorimotor state (in 
this case a slow movement of your foot on the pedal) – output augmented by the 
horse-power of our external vehicle? 
Another example would be operating a crane, and the extended power to 
reach and manipulate objects that are too far, big and heavy to be manipulated 
in your narrower sensorimotor state. Is this a widely augmented I, or just I/O to 
narrow old me?
But before we dismiss too quickly the notion of a wider sensorimotor state, 
note that some of us have literally experienced a change in our felt body image 
when driving a large car: Our sense of our own width, pulling through a narrow 
squeeze, extends to the width of our car, not just our narrow body. This change in 
body image is not unlike the effect induced by distorting prisms, Virtual Reality, or 
even surgery, prosthetic limbs, and  neurological re-adaptation. Tadpoles morphing 
into frogs and caterpillars morphing into butterflies might be undergoing similar 
sensorimotor changes in their body images and powers because of real changes in 
their (narrow) bodies: Are technology-extended bodies all that different?
The advent of language. The effects of cognitive technology can be similar to those 
of sensorimotor technology. Language evolved neurologically for speech and its 
interactive tempo. We can accelerate recorded speech technologically beyond the 
rate we can speak it, yet still understand it. Beyond a certain speed, speech be-
comes gibberish – yet we can read and understand written language at far faster 
speeds (probably because hearing is a more serial medium of processing and vi-
sion is more parallel). 
It is virtually certain that there was no specific neural adaptation for reading, 
which was a technological invention of less than 10,000 years ago. In contrast, 
the language areas of our brain were shaped genetically several hundred thousand 
years ago, altering our neural hardware and radically extending our cognitive pow-
ers.  If spoken language widened our cognitive powers biologically, didn’t reading 
and writing widen them technologically in much the same way?
Language as distributed cognition? Is language itself a form of distributed cogni-
tion? How does the knowledge in other people’s heads, conveyed to us auditorily, 
differ from the knowledge in books, conveyed to us visually? Both allow us to 
access information without needing to gather it the hard way, through our own di-
rect, time-consuming, risky and uncertain sensorimotor experience. Writing and © 2008. John Benjamins Publishing Company
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speaking also allow us to offload our knowledge and memory outside our own 
narrow bodies, rather than having to store it all internally. Individual cognizers 
write books, but Wikipedia, for example, seems to be growing spontaneously ac-
cording to an independent, collective agenda of its own, more like the joint activity 
of a colony of ants.
Computers, distributed digital databases and automated algorithms have aug-
mented both the speed and the computing power of our brains, and that new-
found speed and power is capable of inducing changes in our mental self-image 
not unlike the ones that sensorimotor technology can induce in our body image: 
If being deprived of one’s spectacles or one’s automobile feels rather like the loss of 
eyes or limbs, being deprived of one’s computer or cell-phone feels like the loss of 
one’s intrinsic cognitive and communicative capacity.
Interactive Cognition. Human discourse is certainly interactive cognition, indeed 
collaborative cognition, and the speed and distance at which we could speak, and 
understand our interlocutors, set biological limits on the rate and scope of that 
collaborative cognition, hundreds of thousands of years ago. The speed of verbal 
thought probably co-evolved with language and is probably of the same order of 
magnitude as the speed of oral speech. Although reading speed is much faster 
than listening speed, writing (and typing) speed is not as fast as speaking (and the 
turn-around time of letter delivery is certainly slower than conversational speed). 
So in real-time interactions, at the speed of thought, we still prefer to talk rather 
than write. 
It is only recently that cognitive technology (in this case, email and texting) 
has accelerated the potential speed of written interactions in almost real-time to 
something closer to the speed of thought. Web-based threaded discussion lists, 
and especially their quote/commentary capability, not only accelerate this interac-
tion still further – allowing individual cognizers to interact with the text itself in 
real time. They also increase the scope of this almost-real-time interaction among 
distributed minds and distributed texts; and global posting and immediate acces-
sibility potentially make the collaboration almost instantaneous (Harnad 2004). 
If the human brain was biologically optimized for interactive cognition at 
speaking speed, and writing technology slowed down that interactive cycle (in ex-
change for the other benefits of the transmission and archiving of a written record) 
for thousands of years, then digital online technology has now once again acceler-
ated the interaction to the speed of thought, increasing its power and productivity 
by orders of magnitude, and distributing it globally and instantaneously. It is this 
newfound interactivity (not passive radio, television or film) that is at last truly 
turning Gaia into McLuhan’s (1962) “global village.”© 2008. John Benjamins Publishing Company
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Cognizers and tools. So where does this leave the question of distributed cogni-
tion? It is still cognizers who cognize -- the tool-users, not the tools.9 Yet there is 
no doubt that cognitive technology has radically widened the scope of human cog-
nizing.10 Could “cognitive technology” be the brain’s way of off-loading some of its 
otherwise far greater encoding and processing burden? If so, then the worldwide 
web, a distributed network of cognizers, digital databases and software agents, has 
effectively become our “Cognitive Commons,” in which distributed cognizers and 
cognitive technology can interoperate globally with a speed, scope and degree of 
interactivity that generate cognitive performance powers that would be inconceiv-
able within the scope of individual local cognition alone. 
Cognitive technology and the human mind. Is cognitive technology limited to 
increasing the cognitive performance capacity of its users? No. We have argued 
that cognitive tools are not themselves cognizers, nor do they have -- or serve as 
distributed substrates of -- mental states. But their effects go well beyond mak-
ing human cognition more efficient and productive. Just as noncognitive technol-
ogy (cars, planes, machinery) transformed our somatic lives, so the offloading of 
brain function onto cognitive technology is now transforming our cerebral lives.   
Physical technology altered the frequency, intensity, and manner of our muscle 
use, altering our muscular development (even introducing new ‘technological dis-
eases’, such as carpal tunnel syndrome). Cognitive technology will do likewise, but 
instead of affecting our muscles it will affect our brain development, organization 
and capacities. Changing how we think, learn, and communicate, our cognitive 
tools are reshaping our minds.
Notes
1.   This is even more evident when it comes to what is meant by “superstrings” or “prime number.”
2.  In the case of sexual reproduction, ab ovo, and in the case of asexual reproduction, a poste-
riori, so to speak. Indeed, there is perhaps a lesson to be learned about cognitive function from 
the two forms of reproductive function, since both are “productive” of something beyond the 
narrow borders of the particular organism in question.
3.  i.e., how to detect its Gibsonian “affordances.”
4.  In contrast a baby born with extra limbs will always be considered as a single organism, re-
gardless of how many extra limbs it has, as long as it has just one cognizing mind.
5.  Although without moral training, that is not necessarily enough to prevent the child from 
kicking it!© 2008. John Benjamins Publishing Company
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6.  Having a mind, being in a mental state, being conscious, being in a conscious state, feeling, 
being in a feeling state, feeling anything at all – all of these are synonymous.
7.  Please note that if cognitive technology is only a tool and not part of our mind and a cognizer 
itself, this does not imply that it does not have profound effects on how we cognize --more on 
this later.
8.  (rather like a distributed life, with no organism living it; or a distributed migraine, with no 
one experiencing it)? Isn’t cognition with no cognizer cognizing it like a feeling with no feeler 
feeling it?)
9.  Did some of the ambiguity arise from the fact that we fell into the habit (perhaps because of 
funding agency contingencies) of overusing (for funding purposes) a rather vague and equivo-
cal noun and adjective – “cognition” and “cognitive” – instead of a less impressive verb and 
gerund – “cognize” and “cognizing” – to ask these questions that are basically about thinking 
and knowing? Would we have been ready to say that a library was doing “distributed knowing,” 
or that it was part of a “thinking state” distributed across brains and book-shelves? Or that “col-
laborative cognizing” was any more “distributed” than collaborative thinking or knowing (or 
worrying)?
10.  Epigenetics is perhaps a biological precedent for this (Waddington 1942): Not every trait of 
an organism needs to be genetically encoded in its (“narrow”) DNA. If there are stable environ-
mental influences that can be relied upon to “canalize” the expression of genes without having to 
be written into the blueprint, that takes a needless load off the narrow code, and even allows it 
to be more flexible toward wider environmental contingencies. (Perhaps the neural counterpart 
of Eprigenetics should be called “Epinoetics.”)
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